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Abstract:
The success of regulation and other forms of state and private sector activity in areas of
new technologies are dependent on a number of factors, one of which is the reaction of
public opinion to the innovation concerned. Existing theories of public acceptance of
controversial science-based products bases largely on European and North American
case studies are divided among those which focus on public and consumer knowledge of
the science involved – the ‘deficit model’ and those which stress either the need for trust
in regulatory and private sector actors involved in new product development and
regulation, or the significance of individual cultural norms on attitude formation. This
paper examines two cases of the introduction of controversial science in Asia -
wastewater re-cycling in Singapore and nanotechnology regulation in the China, in order
to assess the influence of these factors in each case. Based on this comparative research,
it is argued that models of public acceptance of controversial science-based products
must also take into account the state’s ability to define the range of public debate as a
key overall parameter of public attitude formation.
1. Introduction
Regulatory policy-making in the field of new technologies involves the design and
adoption of a set of policies which must receive public support. Public attitudes towards
the technology in question thus plays an important role in the determination of
technological regulatory regimes and comparative case study research is required in order
to advance the field.
3The existing literature on the subject of public attitude formation towards
controversial technologies, however, is largely derived largely from European and North
American experiences. Studies of public opinion towards science and emerging
technologies based on these case studies divides into three main competing approaches
which focus on individual behavioural characteristics; respectively, on knowledge and
attentiveness towards science, trust in institutional actors and regulatory bodies, and
citizens’ values and ethical considerations. Understanding which, if any, of the three
competing models of public opinion formation is correct is an important step in
understanding how regulatory activity arises and evolves in affected countries.
However it is also important to know if such models are unduly affected or biased
due to their choice of case study subjects. The emphasis found in these models on
societally-driven opinion formation, for example, may underplays the role of the state in
framing scientific controversies, a subject which is of great significance in many
countries outside of those commonly examined in studies of the subject. This paper
examines two case studies of public reception of controversial technologies in two
countries in Asia – Singapore and China – which feature strong states. As these studies
will show, models of public attitude formation should take the role of the state more
seriously in developing models of general applicability on the subject of opinion and
attitude formation.
Existing Models of Regulatory Regimes and Attitude Formation in Areas of Scientific and
Technological Controversy
4Haga and Willard (2006) provide a framework helpful to understand and explore
the sets of government activities undertaken in emerging areas of public policy based on
leading edge scientific and technological breakthroughs. They argue that five regulatory
dimensions to new technology regulation can be identified: research issues, legal issues,
economic issues, education issues and acceptance and implementation issues. Talukder
and Kuzma (2008) further developed this framework in specifying a set of eight
substantive issues with which regulators have grappled in emerging science-based issues
over the past 20 years. These include intellectual property rights, public information,
commercialization of retail products, safety, health, consumer choice, trade, and research
investment.
But, as Paarlberg (2000) noted in the area of genetically-modified foods, different
countries have developed different kinds of regulatory regimes towards controversial
technologies ranging from policy approaches which are ‘promotional’, to to those which
are ‘permissive’, ‘precautionary’ or preventive’ nature. Thus policies that accelerate the
spread of a controversial technologies within the borders of a nation can be termed
“promotional.” Policies that are neutral toward the new technology, in tending neither to
speed nor to slow its spread, are called “permissive.” Policies intended to slow the spread
of GM crops and foods for various reasons are termed “precautionary.” Finally, policies
that tend to block or ban entirely the spread of this new technology are defined as
“preventive” (Paarlberg 2000:4).
Why these variations exist is a key unanswered question in the literature on the
subject of regulation and public attitude formation towards controversial technologies. Of
the five general Haga and Willard dimensions, four are fairly well developed in the
5literature on science and public policy. Much is known about the research, legal,
economic and education issues related to the substantive technology issue concerns raised
by Talukder and Kuzma. The “acceptance and implementation” dimension, however,
remains a subject of some controversy, and dueling explanatory models, in the literature.
Although participation of the public and stakeholder groups in the technology-driven
policy process is a subject that has received a great deal of attention in more recent years
(Sharp, Yudell, and Wilson 2004; Haga and Willard 2006; Haddow, Laurie,
Cunningham-Burley, and Hunter 2007; Metha 2004; Tutton 2007 Fischhoff and
Fischhoff 2001), the underlying micro-motives of individuals faced with choices about
whether to buy or support the introduction of products based on new technologies remain
uncertain.
The starting point for most studies of public opinion towards new technology
products in the North American and European studies which make up by far the largest
bulk of existing studies on the subject is individuals’ knowledge and understanding of
these new technologies. The so-called ‘‘Deficit Model’’ endorsed by many theorists, if
not empirical studies (Evans & Durant, 1995; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Sturgis & Allum,
2004), for example, holds that attitudes towards emerging technologies stem largely from
individual ignorance about their actual benefits and irrational fears of potential risks.
Public education is thus often prescribed as a necessary correlate of promotional policy-
making although sensationalist media coverage and oppositional groups’ campaigns are
seen as undermining these efforts (Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Renn, Burns, Kasperson,
Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992; Sturgis, Cooper, & Fife-Shaw, 2005).
6The chief assumption of this model is that the public would embrace industry and
regulatory experts’ support for these technologies if it were simply more knowledgeable
about the actual benefits and risks of these technologies.1 However the empirical basis
for such claims is dubious 2 and the model obscures the intent of public education
measures: to provide a level of public support to democratic states required for enhanced
levels of promotional government activity in the area concerned.
The same is true of a second literature on public support for new technologies
which focuses on individuals’ ethical concerns and core values although this literature
moves away from purely individual orientations towards more collective, cultural,
sources of individual opinion formation. Key drivers of individual attitudes in this second
literature include religious and moral inclinations, as well as quasi-spiritual orientations
to living in a natural order/protecting nature, and post-material values regarding the
overall quality of life. These orientations towards nature and technology, it is argued, are
embedded in spiritual beliefs, worldviews, and post-material value positions, implying
that attitudes towards new technologies are resistant to rapid and substantial change. In a
widely cited paper, for example, Sjoberg (2000) showed that earlier studies’ inattention
to moral considerations as bases of technological risk perceptions left much of the
variance of perceived risk unexplained. When ‘unnatural and immoral risk’ factors were
incorporated into his analysis of the perceived risk of nuclear wastes in Sweden, his
model’s explanation of variance increased from 20 percent to 66 percent (Sjoberg,
2000).3
This second literature in its emphasis on cultural values, like the deficit theory
which preceded it, is still very ‘society-centric’ and sees the proper role of the state is
7simply responding to accommodating pre-existing cultural predilections. This is
somewhat different, but not entirely, from the third major stream of literature developed
from ‘western’ case studies, that focusing on the institutional context of scientific
research, including individual and collective levels of trust in regulatory actors and
stakeholders as a key determinant of individual attitudes and actions (Brunk 2006; Priest,
Bonfadelli, & Rusanen, 2003; Yearley, 2000). Trust in institutional actors is seen as
being important because in many societies they are a key source of ‘‘official’’
information on science and technology. As such, it is argued, scientists and state
regulators can play a critical role in providing ostensibly neutral or objective information
to the public (de Jonge et al 2008) but when these institutional actors are not trusted, their
claims are likely to fall on deaf ears, or be consciously rejected (Crawley, 2007; Lang &
Hallman, 2005). Individuals will then look to other sources of information, such as
relatives or friends, social or political organizations, or other perceived experts, as a
conscious basis for their judgments (Bennett & Calman, 1999).
The empirical basis for such studies is quite strong. As Weldon and Laycock
(2009) note, previous research confirms the importance of trust in institutional actors for
support of new technologies (Durant & Legge, 2005; Grove-White, Macnaughten,
Meyer, & Wynne, 1997; Priest et al., 2003; Siegrist, 2000). As they discuss, Priest (2001)
found that for explaining variations in individual support for biotechnology in the United
States, trust in agricultural, biotechnology, and food retail corporations was more
important than knowledge about genetic or genomic science while Barnett et al. (2007)
found that levels of trust in government rules and regulatory bodies in Great Britain are
also much stronger predictors of support for gene therapy, human cloning, and genetic
8databases than attentiveness to genetics and education.4 Although still society-centric in
its focus on individuals as key shapers of public attitudes, unlike the deficit and cultural
models, the institutional trust analysis does begin to hint at a much more significant role
being played in opinion formation by state institutions.
All of these models, however, including the public trust one, do not systematically
assess the role played by the state in framing debates and opinions concerning
controversial technologies. Rather states are seen largely to be at the mercy of “public
opinion”. While may be the case in some European or North American countries,
however, the state plays a much larger role in many countries than in western-European
or Anglo-American liberal democracies and it is an open question whether public opinion
towards controversial science in such countries follows North American or European
liberal-democratic patterns. In what follows below, two controversial technologies –
recycled water use and nanotechnologies, are studied in Singapore and China,
respectively,. As the discussion will show, framing effects undertaken by state actors – in
the one case related to the promotion of the view of a lack of alternatives towards the
technology uses and, in the other, the close association of the technology with national
development plans and goals – are shown to be crucial determinants of public opinion
and attitudes towards the technologies, which are perceived much more favorably in
these two jurisdictions than they are in Europe and North America.
2. Case Studies
Singapore NEWater
Since independence in 1965, Singapore has been dependent on its neighbour
Malaysia for much of its water supply, with two long term water agreements ensuring
9water supply. Over the past four decades, the two countries have experienced periods of
cordial as well as icy bilateral relations. In 1997, Singapore publicly stated that it was
looking at alternative sources of water. This was precipitated by difficulties with
Malaysia over establishment of the price of raw water, with the Malaysians threatening to
increase prices by at least six times and with no set formula upon which to peg to future
increases (Leong, 2010).
In 1998, Singapore began studying wastewater as a source of raw water. The water
would go through a purification and treatment process using membrane and ultraviolet
technologies. Three years later, the reused water was ready for non-potable use – for
wafer fabrication processes, non-potable applications in manufacturing processes, as well
as for air-conditioning cooling towers in commercial buildings. In 2003, the reused water,
named NEWater, was introduced into water reservoirs. The amount made up about 1% of
total daily water consumption in 2009 and will be increased progressively to about 2.5%
of total daily water consumption by 2011 (Leong, 2010).
Singapore is one of the few countries in the world which has been able to overcome
the “yuck” factor in implementing recycled water for drinking. The few studies that have
documented this case point to the careful use of framing by the Government (Leong,
2009) that included the fact that Singapore had no alternative sources of water.
Early Water Reuse in Singapore
Since the early 1960’s, with increasing industrialization and a larger population, the
Government started to review its water sources and considered nonconventional options
such as the reuse of sewage and desalination. By the 1960’s, two large sewage treatment
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plants had been built and by 1971, some 36 industrial premises were using industrial
water. But its use was limited because of poor quality. In early 1970, there was also a
small experiment to use industrial water for toilet flushing. But homeowners were
unhappy with the smell and the dirty water and foaming which resulted. Pipes and pumps
also corroded more quickly then expected. Despite this, the government continued its
efforts. In 1974, it commissioned an S$1.3 million Wastewater Reclamation
Demonstration Plant to determine feasibility of reclaiming wastewater. The plant
produced drinking water that fully met and in some instances exceeded the WHO
International Drinking Water Standards. However, at S$1.10 per m3 of water, the plant
was not cost efficient and was decommissioned in late 1975. But it had proven that it was
possible to reclaim water of good quality from treated wastewater, and moreover, that
reclaiming water from wastewater was cheaper than desalination.
Drinking reused water: NEWater
Some two decades after the Wastewater Reclamation Demonstration Plant closing,
the government returned to the idea of reusing wastewater. It sent a team to study water
reclamation projects in California and West Virginia and on return, built its second Water
Reclamation Demonstration Plant. The S$7 million Plant was completed by May 2000.
It used a dual membrane (microfiltration and reverse osmosis) and ultraviolet light
disinfection process. This method followed the recommendations of the United States
National Research Council in its report on the use of reclaimed water to supplement
water supplies.
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At the same time, the government also put together an Expert Panel comprising local
and foreign experts in engineering, community health, analytics, and water quality. They
provided independent advice to PUB and ENV on the NEWater study. NEWater was
also tested –more than 20,000 analyses and tests, evaluating 191 parameters were carried
out. At the end, the Expert Panel concluded NEWater was safe for potable use and
recommended Singapore consider using it for indirect potable use by blending it with
reservoir water. Rather than pumping it directly into the water supply, NEWater would
first be pumped into reservoirs, and then submitted to conventional water treatment. This
not only provides an additional safety margin and but was expected to garner greater
public acceptance. The Expert Panel also recommended that the PUB put in place a
rigorous monitoring and testing program as long as NEWater has indirect potable use,
with water quality test results reviewed by local and international experts from academia
and industry (Lim, 2009).
High science, low acceptance: Buy in from the people.
The processes outlined above – dual membrane technology and ultraviolet light
disinfection as well as process indirect potable use – were new to the general public, but
is generally well known in scientific circles. That is to say, while the science is not well
known, it is not all that difficult. At the same time, the issue of public acceptance or the
“yuck factor” continue to dog attempts by governments to introduce reuse water. In
Singapore’s case, however, the introduction of NEWater may be seen to have been
greatly helped by a sense of crisis generated by a Malaysian government decision to
revise the price of water piped to the city state. This was a major plank in a concerted and
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strong effort from the Singapore government to “market” NeWater to the public (Leong,
2010).
From the PUB’s point of view, the main goal was to garner public confidence and
acceptance. The introduction of a new source of water supply was unprecedented for the
small island state Singapore, which has relied on two traditional sources of water—from
local catchments and imported water from the Malaysian mainland —since its
independence 40 years ago. It was considered critical to ensure that the introduction of
NEWater did not meet with any significant public opposition. The main aim was to attain
the same level of trust that the population had in PUB water to NEWater.
The PUB official said: “The most difficult, yet critical of them all, was to get the
public to overcome their psychological barrier towards drinking recycled water and
convince them to embrace NEWater as a source of drinking water. To overcome this
barrier, a deliberate attempt was made to shift the attention away from the source by
focusing on the treatment process, which involves using advanced, state-of-the-art
membrane technology.” The PUB tackled the terminology by consciously renaming the
terms that had a negative connotation with terms that would better reflect the process or
value as a resource. They did not use internationally recognized terms such as
‘wastewater’ or ‘sewage’ because these had a negative connotation (Leong, 2010).
Framing recycled water.
The PUB briefed the media and subsequently brought reporters to places in the
United States such as Orange County in California and Scottsdale in Arizona to
demonstrate that water recycling is not a new phenomenon, and that it has actually been a
13
way of life for these people for many years. The PUB also explained the difference
between unplanned indirect potable use which has been practised by cities in Europe for
centuries—treated used water is channelled back into the rivers for use by the next city
downstream and re-channelled back to the same river for use by yet the next city
downstream of it, and this goes on and on—and planned indirect potable use, which
Singapore is practising—where the PUB purifies the treated used water to high standards
and mixes a percentage of it with raw reservoir water before treating it for the drinking
water supply. The PUB also bottled NEWater in attractive packaging so that the public
could sample for themselves how pure it is, and these were distributed at grassroots and
national events. Top government officials became ‘NEWater’ ambassadors and
champions when they were seen drinking NEWater publicly (Leong, 2010).
During the 2002 National Day, some 60,000 Singaporeans toasted NEWater,
demonstrating the support and confidence they had in it. The PUB also set up the
NEWater Visitor Centre to bolster the public education campaign which was opened by
then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 2003 (Lim, 2009).
Names and connotations.
The change in terminology was part of the overall public communications plan to
get the public to overcome their psychological fear and accept NEWater. This was also a
deliberate effort to minimize the association with terms such as ‘sewage’ or ‘wastewater’
which carried a negative connotation.
The PUB official said: “We also wanted the public to understand that this water is
technically not wastewater to be thrown away but water that can be used and reused over
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and over again, similar to how water recycles itself in nature. The plants were renamed
from sewerage treatment plants to water reclamation plants as they were not merely
treating the sewage, but part of the process that reclaims the used water for reuse.”
(Leong, 2010).
Over all, the government made arrangements to “blow down” the “yuck” factor
and concentrate on issues of strategic survival and economic viability. This strategy of
legitimation did this in three steps. First, it worked on companies first – introducing
NEWater as a substitute for municipal supply in industry (eg in semi-conductor wafer
fabrication plants and in air-conditioning cooling towers). Second, it held a massive
grassroots campaign to frame the issue in such a way that showed that the science was
relatively uncontroversial, and in any case, there was no alternative. Third, it also
introduced the water indirectly by pumping it into reservoirs (Leong, 2010).
In just five years NEWater has augmented Singapore’s water supply by 302,000 m3/d
or about 15% of water consumption. The four existing NEWater plants can now meet
more than 15% of Singapore’s water demand - well ahead of the 2010 target date.
Construction of the fifth 227, 000 m3/d NEWater factory at Changi and expansion of the
existing plants has been advanced to meet growing demand. By 2011, the first in which
the first of the two water agreements with Malaysia expires, the five NEWater plants will
have a combined capacity to meet 30% of Singapore’s water needs.
Conclusion
As Dolnicar and Hurlimann (2010) concluded in their study of Australian water
use attitudes, Singapore provides evidence that key factors involved in the acceptance of
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this controversial science product includes (1) costs - when compared to more or less
equally unpalatable alternatives - but this can be trumped by (2) consequences of a
perceived lack of palatable alternatives and (3) the key role played by governments in
transmitting this knowledge and framing this discussion in such a way as to portray the
unpalatable alternative in as favourable a light as possible. In Singapore, the argument
from lack of alternatives is particularly strong since the country is dependent on its
neighbour for two thirds of its water supply and the issue is framed as one of national
survival. A comparison of Singapore’s case with that of Queensland Australia, which also
tried to implement water reuse in its drinking water supply, showed that the discourse in
Singapore’s case was markedly different in its tone. Media reports showed a higher
degree of neutrality and focused on the practical implications, rather than the
physiological aspects of water reuse.(Leong, 2009).
Nanotechnology in China
Introduction
The ability to arrange atoms lies at the foundation of many technologies (Drexler 2006,
p.55). It is merely variation in the arrangement of atoms that differentiates sand from
computer chips, cancer from healthy tissue, or gold from bauxite. Nanotechnology is a
generic term for a series of technologies that begin to change the molecular structure of
biological entities, proteins, DNA, and the building blocks that generate and control
biological outcomes. These technologies are able to engineer molecular and atomic
variation in the composition of compounds to produce new materials with new properties
and characteristics. DNA engineering, for example, can build precise, million-atom
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frameworks where “engineered proteins can bind to precise locations on these
frameworks,” and where “proteins can bind other components” that are electrically or
chemically active such that these proteins and the biological structures on which they are
attached “serve as construction machinery” (Drexler 2006, p.12).
Nanotechnology is thus a diverse collection of academic specialisms centered
around engineering and manipulating molecular and atomic structures and, in the process,
creating biological and non-biological nanomaterials whose characteristics can be made
to order. It deals with structures sized between 1 to 100 nanometers in dimension ─ 1
nanometre being equal to one billionth of a meter (Renn & Roco 2006, p.153; see also
Lindquist, Mosher-Howe & Lui 2010). This holds vast prospects for technological
innovations in areas such as electronics through the development of nanocircuitry,
molecular level semiconductors, nanotubes, new materials development in ceramics,
polymers, glass ceramics and composites, and in medicine with the development of
nanoelectronic biosensors and nanoscale drug particles and delivery systems to improve
the accuracy and efficiency of drug toxicity to harmful tissue and disease ─ among many
others.
Nanomaterials are currently present in over 1,200 commonly consumed products
ranging from cosmetics, clothing, personal care and hygiene items, sporting goods,
sunscreen, and in household filtration systems and construction materials. The paper ring
that holds a MacDonald’s hamburger together is glued with a nano based resin; wounds
are now often dressed with an “Acticoat” dressing or applied “Acnel” lotion for dry skin,
each with nanomaterials incorporated into their production (Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies, 2010). The US National Science Foundation estimates that $70
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Billion worth of nano containing items are sold in the United States each year while the
global market for manufactured goods containing nanotechnology is estimated to reach
$2.6 trillion by 2014 (The Nanotech Gamble, 2010; Lux Research). The rate of
development and incorporation of nanotechnologies into all facets of consumer,
industrial, and medical applications is anticipated to double every two years.
Science and Nanotechnology in China
While the United States has led global investment into research and development in
nanotechnology, China is fast emerging as a global player. By 2005, China ranked only
second to the US in nanotechnology investment, ranked second in terms of the number of
nano-related peer reviewed research publications, producing 15% of all global nano
related research papers, and had emerged as the global leader in carbon nano-tube
technology and manufacture, as well as a leader in the manufacture of nano-coatings,
anti-corrosive nano paints used in ship construction and oil tanks, odor eating nano
coatings and plastics for refrigerators, nano filters for air conditioners, as well as a series
of nano materials used in optics to filter glare and in the production of nano textiles and
clothing to enhance antimicrobial properties (Shapira & Wang 2009, p.461; see also Liu
& Zhang 2005, p.397).5
China’s push to become a global leader in nanotechnology reflects a national
strategy aimed at leapfrogging the developmental cycle. While development of the
export sector has facilitated rapid economic growth primarily through specialization in
low to medium value-adding manufacturing, sustained growth will be contingent on
moving up the value chain. Leading Chinese policy makers, economic planners and
influential economists all recognize the need to address China’s dependence on low
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value-added export-led growth. As the Vice President of the China National Academy of
Nanotechnology and Engineering (CNANE) notes, “China must break away from the
mode of technology dependence and transform into independent technology innovation
…It is very clear that [in China] the leading power is in the tight grasp of foreign
enterprises” (as quoted in Appelbaum & Parker 2008, p.319).
China’s science and technology policy is thus informed by a singular rationale:
economic growth situated in the context of developing indigenous scientific and
technological capacity to reduce reliance on technology transfer, export led growth, and
low end manufacturing. Importantly, China sees its science and technology policy as a
central pillar in its efforts to become a global leader in innovation; a net exporter of ideas,
innovative technologies and commercial applications.
Developing Nanoscience and Nanotechnology in China
China’s science and technology programs are situated around a central policy
architecture announced by Deng Xiaoping in 1986, the National High Technology
Research and Development Program, known as the 863 program. The 863 program is
implemented through successive five year plans and aimed at “promoting the
development of key novel materials and advanced manufacturing technologies for raising
industry competitiveness” including nano-materials (Appelbaum & Parker 2008, p.323).
Between 1990-2002 the 863 Plan funded over 1000 nanotech projects with a total
investment of USD 27 Million (Bai 2005, pp.61-63). The 863 Program is managed by an
expert responsibility system, with field-/sector-specific expert committees and panels
comprised of the nation’s top scientists who supervise, advise and assess projects
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(National High Tech R&D Program - 863 Program).
The first nano-specific project under the 863 program was the Climbing Project
on Nanomaterial Science instigated between 1990-1999 and overseen by the State
Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), the predecessor to the current Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST). Because of the Program’s success the government
subsequently renewed its commitment to funding basic research on nanomaterials and
nanostructures (i.e. carbon nanotubes) with the initiation of China’s National Basic
Research Program (973 Program) in 1997. Since 2006, 10 nanotechnology research
projects have received a combined USD 30 Million (USD 3 Million each) under the
Program.
In addition to the 863 program, the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) also
addressed priorities for the commercialization and development of nanotechnology. The
government disaggregated nanotechnology development between short (development of
nano-materials), medium (development of bio-nanotechnology and nano-medical
technology), and long-term projects (development of nano-electronics and nano-chips).
The Five-Year Plan prioritized bridging the gap between nanotechnology research and
market demand to form a complete national innovation system (National High Tech R&D
Program (863 Program). The 11th Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) in turn places emphasis on
innovative technologies, including the development of new materials for information,
biological and aerospace industries and industrializing the technology for 90-nanometer
and smaller integrated circuits (Yongnian & Minja 2006).
Under the medium and longer term master plan (MLP), nanotechnology
development is given priority status and recognized as one of four “megaprojects” central
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to China’s science and technological development and designed to reshape fundamentally
China’s R & D capacity (Cao, Suttmeier & Simon 2006). To realize these ambitions, the
government has set an ambitious target for national R&D spending of 2.5% of GDP
(USD 4.3 Trillion) by 2020 (World Development Indicators; Medium to Long-term Plan
for Development of Science and Technology), targeting R & D in nano-materials and
devices, nano-scale complementary metal-oxide semiconductor devices, nano-drug
carriers, and nano-materials (Medium to Long-term Plan for Development of Science and
Technology). Between 2006 and 2008, the MLP funded 29 nanotechnology projects in 22
universities and research institutes across the country, totaling USD 38.2 million
(Applebaum 2009, p. 20).
Chinese Public Perceptions of Nanotechnology and Nano Risks
While the full impact of China’s push for leadership in nanotechnology and
nanomaterials is yet to be realized, policy planning, regulation and management of the
sector reveals much about Chinese public attitudes towards nanotechnology, and, in turn,
how the discourse and management of possible nano risks are framed and approached by
public agencies and regulators. While nanotechnology holds enormous potential for
commercial gain, cutting edge technological innovation and the development of an
innovative knowledge economy, the risks associated with nanotechnologies and
nanomaterials on human health and the environment remain largely unknown. Recent
laboratory experiments on carbon nanotubes suggest that they could be as dangerous as
asbestos fibres (Greenemeier, 2008; Falkner 2008; Scheufele et al, 2007). More
importantly, nanotoxicity is thought to display an inverse relationship to particulate size;
that is the smaller is the particulate matter the more toxic such particulates tend to be
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(The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, September 22, 2010). The precise
dimensions of these risks, however, especially with longer term exposure or exposure
through nanomaterials engineered in chemical composites and utilised in industrial and
chemical applications are yet to be determined. For this reason, nanotech-specific safety
regulations, toxicity and exposure levels have not been formalised or a commonly
accepted international safety regulatory framework established (Breggin et al 2009).
Science has historically approached new technologies by invoking the
precautionary principle. Broadly stated, the precautionary principle assumes that if a
technology or policy has a suspected risk of harm (to individuals, the public or the
environment) absent scientific consensus about the extent and magnitude of these risks
the burden of proof that the technology or policy is not harmful falls to its proponents. In
China and the case of nanotechnology, however, the extent to which the precautionary
principle guides the adoption of nanotechnologies and the use of nanomaterials is
problematic. Several interrelated factors contribute to this.
First, the discourse framing China’s pursuit of nanotechnology is tied intimately
to a national political agenda. As one of four science based “megaprojects,”
nanotechnology occupies an iconic policy space that is highly politicised. Far from a
science based initiative, nanotechnology in China has thus to be appreciated in relation to
centralised “command and control” economic planning. Nanotechnology research and
development thus operates under the burdens of expected national economic
transformation, the delivery of substantial commercial outcomes, the development of a
knowledge based economy, a reduction in China’s technology dependence, and the
flagship of China’s ambitions to assume global leadership in science and technology.
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Public perceptions of nanotechnology thus tend to be received and understood in relation
to sustaining and increasing national economic well being, the prospective assumption of
global leadership in cutting edge technologies and science, and improving the quality of
life for Chinese citizens.
Second, the framing of nanotechnology in such overtly nationalist and
aspirational contexts diminishes the political space for dissent or for the public to raise
questions or concerns about safety issues, or risks associated with the impact of
nanotechnology on human health and the environment. Rather, public perceptions of
nanotechnology tend to be celebrated in concert with a “rising China” and as evidence of
China’s destiny to assume a global leadership role.
Third, the command and control style approach to national economic planning
and the development of nanotechnology creates elite, technocratic processes, limiting the
spaces for wider consultation or public participation about the role, desirability, potential
applications, and impact of nanotechnology. In a sense, the public are shut out of the
policy spaces around which science and technology policy is determined, or where risks
and questions about potential harm from such technologies can be assessed. As the head
of China’s National Steering Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology
(NSCNN), the peak body overseeing nanotechnology in China observed, nanotechnology
is highly technical, requires specialist knowledge, and the public doesn’t have the
technical capacities or knowledge to understand the technologies or assess potential risks
(interview, January 16 2010). Indeed, it was suggested that excluding the public or civil
society groups from participation in reviews and debates was advantageous, since they
might react inappropriately or form misperceptions about potential nano-risks due to
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technical deficiencies and a poor grounding in nanotechnologies. Involving the public or
wider non-science based communities in discussions was thus seen as a potentially risky
consultation process possibly undermining national goals, not as a subject for public
education (see also Satterfield et al 2009).
Fourth, the “knowledge deficit” problem which in other national contexts sees the
science community engage in outreach and education activities to raise evidenced based
knowledge about new technologies, in China and the nanotechnology sector tends not to
operate. In part this derives from a hierarchical technocratic system where there is a
collusion of interests between central planners and the nano-science community; in part
because public perceptions toward science and scientists is deferential, with scientists
highly respected and revered for their contributions to China’s national economic
advances. Such perceptions thus tend to reinforce the relative autonomy of the nano-
science community as the professionals most able to manage and assess the risks of
nanotechnology (see also Brown 2009). Such attitudes tend to moot vocal opposition,
limit potential avenues for engagement between the science community and public / civil
society groups, and lessen the incentives for scientists to disseminate evidenced based
knowledge to the public.
Fifth, these political-social hierarchies tend to be self-reinforcing. Absent
external, public based scrutiny, or the ability of civil society to engage critically with
evidenced based risk assessments of nanotechnologies, concerns about the potential risks
of nanotechnologies or exposure to nanomaterials are left to the science community to
explore. The patron-client relationship that operates between central planners and the
nano-science community, however, creates disincentives to design research programs
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focused on the risk impacts of nanotechnologies. Indeed, two senior Chinese
nanoscientists when interviewed about possible conflicts of interest admitted that younger
scientists are incentivised to under-report or downplay possible negative impacts of
nanotechnologies. As they explained, funding streams for R & D are predominantly
driven by the prospects for commercialization. Apart from establishing standards for
nano-toxicity, researchers were incentivised to open nano-research avenues and not close
them down through highlighting potential risks or downsides (interview, January 16
2010).
Conclusion
Public perceptions about nanotechnology in China are a product of its association
with China’s economic ambitions to catapult itself into the forefront of global science and
technology research and development. Few countries in the world have such a deeply
entwined economic and political agenda meshed within a national science project. China,
in this sense, displays a situation where public attitudes towards nanotechnology are
largely celebrated and revered for their potential contributions to national economic
transformation. More generally, the celebrated historical achievements of Chinese
leadership in science and technology, and the deferential attitudes of the public towards
science and scientists, is generally witness to a high level of trust and respect toward the
scientific community. Rather than any innate suspicion, nanotechnology as with other
technological innovations, has thus been welcomed and perceived to be advantageous,
bringing with it potential economic and social advancement.
There is, obviously, a democratic deficit in public knowledge, participation and
consultation concerning nanotechnologies. Aspects of state structure and behaviour such
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a the command and control decision making, the patron-client relationship that exists
between the state and nano-science community, and the funding mechanisms that enable
R & D into nanotechnologies, all contribute to discrete and relatively narrow spaces for
public knowledge and engagement on nanotechnology issues. The result is a relatively
positive and at worst benign set of public attitudes toward nanotechnologies, in part
fostered by low levels of information about nanotechnologies or possible risks associated
with exposure to nanomaterials.
3. Conclusion
The notion that new technologies are a growing area of policy concern is reflected
in many countries in the increasing use of processes such as Danish-style consensus
conferences in countries like Norway, the Netherlands, France, Japan, South Korea, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Seifert 2006:77). The reception of
controversial technologies like biotechnology in general (Coyle and Fairweather 2005;
Hornig Priest 2006; World Health Organization 2005), in the medical field (Greely 2001;
Avard, Grégoire, and Jean 2008), and of genetically modified foods in particular (Andrée
2006; Durant and Legge 2006), has highlighted the need to better understand public
opinion and attitude formation among consumers and observers of new products and
processes. However the models which currently exist to explain public attitude formation
towards controversial technology are overly societally-centric and fail to adequately
address the ability of state actors in many countries to successfully articulate or direct
public opinion
The deficit model rests on the idea that individuals are essentially autonomous
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“rational” opinion formers and do so by recourse to their knowledge of the costs and
benefits of specific technologies. But a consensus does not exist even within the scientific
community on the benefits and costs of many technologies (Priest & Gillespie, 2000)
and, similarly, most individuals also perceive both risks and benefits in specific
technologies (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005).
There is little evidence that individuals make rational decisions in the strict sense
suggested by the deficit model. Instead, humans appear to be ‘‘cognitive satisficers’’ who
use heuristics or cues as quick shortcuts in their decision-making process (Popkin, 1994;
Simon, 1957). The second standard model derived from western liberal-democratic
country studies focuses on the cultural, religious and ethical frames which can serve this
purpose (Zaller, 1992).
However this model again assumes some consistency in these heuristics which may
not exist and is not clear about the exact relationship posited to exist between knowledge
and attitudes. This has raised to the forefront of many discussions the role played by
trust. That is, for example, as Weldon and Laycock (2009) have argued, trust in scientific
actors and ethical value concerns “can be viewed as two critical heuristics that help guide
individual judgments. When individuals lack the knowledge needed to make effective
decisions, they often turn to perceived experts. Trusted experts’ judgments may serve as a
quick cue for citizens’ own positions, simply substituting the former for the latter.” This
extends beyond social actors such as experts, however, to “official” actors such as state
agencies and institutions charged with regulating and communicating authoritative
information to citizens.
This latter point highlight a key under-explored factor in these models: the role
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played by governments in both creating and managing public opinion through publicity
and public information campaigns. While many studies to date have focused on liberal –
democratic states which feature less active states, in many countries governments play
much more active and central roles in opinion formation both towards traditional subjects
of state interest and towards novel innovative technologies.
As the two case studies presented here of active states in Asia revealed, both in
Singapore in the case of NEWater and in China in the case of nanotechnologies, states
played a much more significant role in opinion formation on controversial technologies
than has hitherto been highlighted in the literature. Although with some very distinct
differences given their different levels of democracy and the nature of their scientific and
technology research and regulatory institutions, inn both countries the state was able to
frame a controversial technology as a key factor in national survival and/or national
development. This framing was able to successfully overcome or avoid popular concerns
with the technology and allow the state to pursue a much more promotional regulatory
approach to the technology than would otherwise have been the case. Successfully
convincing a large enough part of the public that little alternative exists to adopting a
controversial technology appears to go a long way to overcoming cognitive, affective and
attitudinal reservations to its generalization and use and highlights the need for
comparative studies of the subject to take the state more seriously in its research agenda.
Endnotes
1 At the aggregate level, survey findings provide some evidence to support this
interpretation. Study after study has shown that the public is ‘‘scientifically illiterate,’’
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lacking even a basic understanding of science, let alone of knowledge of sophisticated
new technologies (e.g., Miller, 1983, 1998; Sturgis et al., 2005). For example, a 1999
Eurobarometer survey that asked ten basic high school-level biology questions, including
several about genes and biotechnology, found that the average respondent across 17 West
European countries could only answer 5.2 of the questions correctly (Gaskell et al.,
2001). Surveys in other advanced industrial democracies, including the United States and
Canada, have found comparable results (Gaskell & Jackson, 2005).
2 Empirical studies, particularly from the more general public understanding of
science literature, however, have found a positive, but only very weak, correlation
between levels of scientific knowledge and levels of support for new technological
advances (see, for example, Bauer, Durant, & Evans, 1994; Evans & Durant, 1995;
Miller et al., 1997; Sturgis & Allum, 2004). In fact, more recent studies suggest that this
would not necessarily lead to greater support of new technologies as predicted by this
model. The strongest test of the model probably comes from studying participants in
deliberative public forums on specific technologies. Early research suggests these
experiences may actually heighten participants’ concerns about the risks and decrease
support for the new technologies. For example, a recent study of a nanotechnology
citizen forum in the United States found that before deliberation, 82 percent of
participants thought the potential benefits of the technology outweighed the risks; that
number dropped to 66 percent after the deliberation period (Hamlett, Cobb, & Guston,
2008; see also Gavelin et al., 2007).
3 In a 2005 study of New Zealand public and expert attitudes towards 18 gene
technologies, Sjoberg again showed that public concerns about interfering with nature,
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the moral value of technology, and trust in science offered stronger explanatory force
than affective and risk assessment factors (Sjoberg, 2005). To Sjoberg, these concerns are
rooted in ideological convictions, comparable to the worldviews and spiritual orientations
anchoring New Zealander’s attitudes towards technology in general.
4 In fact, when controlling for trust factors, Weldon and Laycock (2009) found that
attentiveness and education have been negatively correlated with support for these
modern technologies (Barnett et al., 2007, p. 929). Looking more closely at feelings of
trust towards competing regulatory and social group actors, they found Priest et al. (2003)
to have “argued compellingly that individuals often trust these two actors at markedly
differing levels, and that the ‘‘trust gap’’ is the most decisive factor in explaining
variation in individual attitudes towards biotechnologies”.
5 Carbon nanotubes (fullerenes) are derived from graphene, rolled into sheets and then
tubes. They have a length to diameter ratio of up to 132,000,000 to 1, a magnitude much
greater than conventional materials which endow them with unique strength, and
properties such as thermal and electrical conductivity, making them ideal for
incorporation into electronics and optics. See Cess Dekker (1999) “Carbon nanotubes as
molecular quantum wires,” Physics Today 52: 22–2. See also Richard P. Appelbaum &
Rachel A. Parker (2008), China’s Bid to become a Global Nanotech Leader: Advancing
Nanotechnology through State-Led programs and International Collaborations,” Science
& Public Policy, 35(5), June, pp.330-331.
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